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* 
‘The real thief is not one who steals valuables from the attic, but rather the accomplice who 
collects the loot to safety.’1 
ABSTRACT 
Through a focus on the ‘High Value Migrants’ programme of the United 
Kingdom, this article directs attention to how commercial  migration laws 
and policies of developed countries could impact negatively on the global 
south. Drawing mainly on insights from criminology and development 
studies, it investigates how the commercial migration laws and policies, 
specifically the aspects that deal with encouraging or attracting ‘high-
value’ foreign entrepreneurs and investors hold out the state as 
potentially complicit in corruption and underdevelopment in the global 
south. There is an important need to address the implicated migration 
laws and policies as a critical and integral part of the international 
efforts to combat corruption and promote peace and development in the 
global south. Reform of the implicated laws and policies is in the long 
term interest of all stakeholders.   
INTRODUCTION 
Corruption has developed into an issue of grave concern all over the world 
2
 as it continues to 
grow.
3
 A recent global poll of 26 countries by the British Broadcasting Corporation found 
that 68% of respondents in the polled countries considered corruption as the most worrisome 
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global issue.
4
 It was second only to extreme poverty which polled 69%.
5
  Corruption came 
‘first’ in ten ‘mostly developing countries;’ Russia, China, Nigeria, Peru, Ghana, Kenya, 
Philippines, Colombia, Ecuador and Egypt.
6
 This confirms the view that the problem of 
corruption is worst felt in the global south with its many developing or underdeveloped 
countries than elsewhere.
7
 The global south as used in this article follows the conceptual 
geographic division of the world into a global north and a global south, the ‘North-South’ 
divide. While there has been some push towards the breakdown of the dichotomy between 
the North (North America, Europe, Russia, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) and the South 
(the rest of the world) his article shares the view that the dichotomy remains a reality despite 
some blurring which has taken place with the ascendance of globalisation processes.
8
 In this 
vein, the global south as used in this article refers to the developing and underdeveloped 
countries mainly in Africa and Asia. 
In similar vein, migration has become a complex and politically volatile issue around the 
world but especially so for developed economies like the United Kingdom and other member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 
United Kingdom and other OECD countries have faced continuing challenges on migration 
principally from developing countries of Africa and South East Asia. Corruption, with its 
deleterious impact on socio-economic development is implicated in economic migration from 
developing countries of the global south to OECD countries like United Kingdom, Australia, 
and Canada. Yet, little scholarly attention has been paid to the possible link between the illicit 
transfers of corrupt gains from abuses of office, especially by Politically Exposed Persons, 
(PEPs) and the migration laws and policies of OECD countries like the United Kingdom that 
seek to attract so called ‘high-value’ migrants which include (though not limited to) foreign 
entrepreneurs and investors.  
There is an important link between serious economic crimes like grand or political corruption 
and money laundering. This is a critical point  in relation to PEPs - a high-risk category in the 
experience of  corruption- because, as the discussion in part II shows, a disturbing proportion 
                                                          
4
 See BBC Global News, The World Speaks 2011- A Major New Annual Poll from BBC Global News (BBC 
World Service London 2011) 6. 
5
 BBC Global News, op. cit., n.. 4,  p.10. 
6
 Id. 
7
 Thus for instance, corruption ranked as the 7
th
 issue of concern in the UK and Germany, 8
th
 in Japan and 9
th
 in 
Mexico of 14. See BBC Global News, op.cit., n. 4, p.6. 
8
 M. Ould-Mey, ‘Currency Devaluation and Resource Transfer from the South to the North’ (2003) 93 (2) 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 463, 463. 
3 
 
of  PEPs in many parts of the global south have been identified with corruption. It should be 
of concern that this category of people also constitutes a potential constituency for economic 
migration schemes like the United Kingdom’s ‘Highly Valued Migrants’ category which seek 
to attract investors and entrepreneurs. The opportunity for money-laundering may not be pre-
condition for the incidence of corruption. However, it is rational to assume, and research does 
support the view, that the opportunity for money laundering is key to the thriving of grand 
corruption since the former facilitates the processing and disposition of proceeds of the latter.  
In this regard, a recent Global Witness report observes that ‘Without access to the 
international financial system it would be much harder for corrupt politicians from the 
developing world to loot their national treasuries or accept bribes.’9 In other words, reduced 
prospects for laundering the proceeds of corruption (or any other large scale economic crime 
for that matter) constitute a disincentive for grand corruption. From a criminological 
perspective, this point is critical in the fight against corruption; the risk of detection 
constitutes an important factor in the calculus of offending.
10
 On this view, the opportunity to 
launder the proceeds of corruption constitutes an important factor in the calculation of corrupt 
public office holders.  
This article directs attention to the important nexus between aspects of economic migration 
laws and policies of the United Kingdom (as an example of an OECD country) and the 
incidence of corruption and underdevelopment in the countries of the global south. The crux 
of the discussion that follows simply stated is that the category of economic migration 
policies such as the ‘High Value Migrants’ scheme  of the United Kingdom (and some other 
OECD countries) has the potential to promote and facilitate corruption in the global south 
especially by PEPs. It is argued that there is potential complicity on the part of the developed 
countries through the instrumentality of migration laws and policies for political corruption 
and underdevelopment in the global south. There is an important and urgent need to address 
the implicated migration laws and policies of these countries as a critical and integral part of 
the international efforts to combat corruption and promote peace and development in the 
global south. 
The article proceeds in this way. Part I provides conceptual clarification of key concepts of 
the article; Corruption, Politically Exposed Persons, Money-Laundering and Migration Law. 
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Money laundering distorts national and international economies. Part II examines the link 
between money laundering and corruption. Part III is devoted to the analysis of pro-
corruption migration laws and policies of the United Kingdom with specific reference to 
aspects of its commercial migration policies. In Part IV, I discuss the connections among 
corruption, poverty, conflict and underdevelopment. The article concludes that the migration 
policies under consideration ought to be scrutinised to ensure they do not promote corruption 
in the global south. 
I. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS: CORRUPTION, 
POLICTICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS, MONEY-LAUNDERING AND 
MIGRATION LAW  
It is relevant to briefly clarify what is meant by ‘Corruption’, ‘Politically Exposed Persons’ 
‘Money-Laundering’ and Migration Law since all four are central to the discussion in this 
article. Corruption is a notably difficult concept to define.
11
 Part of the difficulty in providing 
a uniform definition for corruption derives from corruption’s multidimensional nature; ‘what 
is considered a bribe or inducement in one society or culture may be regarded as a gift in 
another.’12 Nonetheless, it has been suggested that there are ‘symmetries of understanding on 
what constitutes corruption.’13 The symmetries suggest a consistent feature of the various 
definitions of corruption is the notion that it is ‘some form of deviation from acceptable 
norms that prevail (or at the least, are believed to prevail) in a particular context.’14 Further, 
corruption, particularly political corruption, which is mostly implicated in this discussion, is 
generally recognised as abuse of office or position of public trust reposed in an individual, to 
secure personal benefits.
15
  
In delineating political corruption, Inge Amundsen explains that political corruption occurs at 
the ‘highest levels of the political system.’16  This sphere involves politicians, elected or 
appointed government ministers, senior civil servants and other elected, nominated or 
appointed senior public office holders, holding positions of public trust (and power). Political 
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corruption as a genre of political crime, takes place ‘when these officials, who make and 
enforce law in the name of the people, are themselves corrupt.’17 This category of people 
overlaps with PEPs described below. 
The incidence of ‘grand corruption’ has led to the creation of a connection between money-
laundering- otherwise a crime not limited to processing of corrupt loot- and the political 
class. This connection is reflected in the development of the term, ‘Politically Exposed 
Persons.’ In the words of anti-corruption campaigner, Robert Palmer, ‘Politically Exposed 
Persons’ are ‘senior public officials, their immediate family and close associates.’ However, 
as he further explains, being a PEP does not connote that every individual in that category is 
corrupt. The critical point is that individuals in the category ‘are exposed to an increased 
corruption risk’ because of their position in government, access to, or influence over those in 
power in the award of contracts, concessions, policy making, and so on.
18
 In short, PEPs are 
those who by virtue of their public positions or closeness to those in such positions have the 
opportunity to use their power for personal (usually economic) gain in a manner that is 
detrimental to the public interest.    
Definitions of money-laundering suggest it is a derivative crime. Nicholas Ryder’s 
descriptive definition of money-laundering provides a good insight into the nature of the 
crime. According to Ryder, money-laundering is a criminal activity which involves 
‘concealing assets to avoid discovery of any unlawful activity that fashioned them.’19 A 
similar definition is that ‘money laundering is the process of disguising illegitimate income to 
make it appear legitimate.’20 Both definitions, suggest that money-laundering as stated 
earlier, follows on the initial commission of a criminal act in a manner to disguise the taint 
deriving from the proceeds thereof. Notwithstanding the challenges of tracking money-
laundering, analysts have identified three cognisable stages; placement, layering and 
integration.
21
 Placement (‘pre-wash’) stage involves the introduction of the proceeds of crime 
into the financial. This may be done in a discreet manner to avoid the scrutiny of money-
laundering reporting policy or legislation. The layering stage involves the launderer engaging 
in transactions that seek to distance the funds from their illicit source. The integration stage is 
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that point at which the initially ‘dirty’ money having been ‘cleaned’ (at the layering stage) is 
re-invested into the economy.
22
 
It is further apt to clarify the sense in which ‘migration law’ is used in this article, particularly 
in view of the divergence in the terminology relating to the issue in the United Kingdom (in 
focus), Australia and Canada to which some comparative references are made. Catherine 
Dauvergne’s definition of migration law as ‘the domestic law or laws which regulate the 
entry and stay of foreigners [into a particular country]’23 is apt. Following Dauvergne’s lead, 
‘migration law’ covers the body of legislation that are commonly referred to as ‘immigration 
and asylum’ laws in the United Kingdom where both are further ‘meshed with nationality 
law’.24  
  II. LINK BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND (INTERNATIONAL) MONEY-
LAUNDERING 
There is an important link between corruption and money laundering
25
 as the two ‘go hand in 
hand.’26 This is particularly the case with corruption involving PEPs. Corrupt public officials, 
it has been noted will place the proceeds of their illicit gains where it is relatively safe, 
usually in foreign countries.
27
 However, this connection remains relatively under-researched. 
This is problematic given the view that any serious effort to combat corruption ought to pay 
attention to how the proceeds are handled. Put in another way, there should be coordination 
between anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering initiatives because of the symbiotic 
relationship between the two. As Susan Rose-Ackerman argues, knowledge of relative ease to 
keep proceeds of bribery or other illicit funds outside of the source country encourages 
corruption.
28
 
The difficulty of tracing and securing proof of corrupt practices makes corruption an 
attractive prospect. The effect of this difficulty can be analogised with the ambivalence that 
characterises the identification, classification, and prosecution of white collar crimes. 
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Ambivalence on critical issues regarding the nature and operations of white collar crimes 
(and criminals) has created a situation whereby key actors in social and criminal justice 
policy, law enforcement agencies as well as the public are hardly able to follow more than a 
poor trail of that type of crime. Even the most basic question of whether white collar crimes 
constitute crimes at all, remains subject of debate.
29
 In the same way, the difficulty of tracing 
proceeds of corruption from developing countries fosters the atmosphere of impunity that 
commonly characterise political corruption in those countries.   
There is an established pattern whereby former colonial overlord-countries are the preferred 
destination of looted funds from their former territories. Financial institutions in the United 
Kingdom (along with Swiss Banks) have been choice ‘recipients’ of looted public funds from 
Nigeria for example.
30
 The story is the same from Africa, Latin America, to Asia. Mobutu 
Sese Seko, former President of Zaire, (1965-97) allegedly stashed away an estimated USD 5 
billion in Western banks.
31
 Jean-Claude Duvalier, as President of Haiti (1971-86), the poorest 
country in the western hemisphere, is believed to have stolen USD 300 to USD 800 million 
while Mohamed Suharto erstwhile President of Indonesia, (1967-98) carted away an 
estimated princely figure of USD 15 to 35 billion from his country.
32
 Ferdinand Marcos as 
President of Philippines (1972-86) is similarly thought to have embezzled an estimated USD 
5 to 10 billion and Albert Fujimori, former Peruvian President (1990-2000) is believed to 
have stashed away USD 600 million.
33
 The bulk of these stolen funds meant for development 
of various countries in the global south are generally believed to have found their ways into 
the financial institutions of OECD countries.
34
 In this regard, Palmer notes that ‘Kleptocrats’ 
turn to the international financial system to launder the proceeds of corruption as the amounts 
involved are usually so large that they simply cannot be held in cash.
35
 
The magnitude of the problem is illustrated in a report which states that (poor) developing 
countries lost between USD 850 billion and 1.06 trillion through ‘illicit channels’ in 2006 
alone. This figure far outstrips USD 103.9 billion official aid provided during the same year 
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by the 22 member countries of OECD Development Assistance Committee.
 36
 The figures 
suggest ‘development efforts’ in the poor countries would yield next to no results under the 
prevailing circumstances. Indeed, for those interested in the development of poor countries, 
‘decades of underachieving efforts might have illicit outflows as one underlying reason.’37 
Another report emphasises that most of the proceeds of high level crime in Africa, but 
especially those from political corruption is invested outside the continent.
38
  
III. PRO-CORRUPTION MIGRATION LAWS AND POLICIES 
Migration has emerged as an issue of serious concern for most OECD countries and certainly 
for all of the relatively high income ones like the United Kingdom. There is substantial panic 
at the current rate of migration particularly from developing countries to the developed 
(OECD) ones. The United Kingdom (and other OECD member states like Australia and 
Canada in particular), is witnessing a wave of migration that has led to serious socio-political 
and economic concerns. As a recent OECD publication states, ‘Migration policies and the 
challenge of the integration of immigrants have risen to the forefront of the political agenda 
in many OECD countries.’39 The media is awash with reports of a deluge of immigrants and 
asylum seekers. As Dauvergne rightly states: 
There is an international moral panic afoot about migration. Newspapers around the 
world report daily on illegal migrants arriving in boats, trucks, planes and trains. 
There are calls in Britain, Australia, Canada and elsewhere to alter the way refugees 
are treated, or even denied.
40
 
The moral panic about migration from the latter part of the twentieth century has shifted 
migration from the paradigm of a legalised phenomenon (with which it started out at the 
beginning of that century), to an ‘illegalized’ one.41 
                                                          
36
A. Fontana, ‘“What Does Not Get Measured, Does Not Get Done”: The Methods and Limitations of 
Measuring Illicit Financial Flows’ (2010) 2 U4 Brief 1-4, 1 available at:  
http://www.u4.no/document/publication.cfm?3720=what-does-not-get-measured-does-not-get-done 
(last accessed 26 April 2011). 
37
 Fontana, op.cit., n. 36. 
38
 UNODC, op.cit., n. 34, p.p. 91. 
39
 OECD, A Profile of Immigrant Populations in the 21st Century: Data from OECD Countries (OECD 
Publishing Paris 2008).  
40
Dauvergne, op.cit., n 23 .p. 588.  
41
 C. Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2008) 1-2.   
9 
 
Dauvergne also directs attention to an additional complication to the issue of migration; real 
or perceived security concerns. She observes that the ‘worldwide fear of terror has 
overlapped and intertwined with the fear of illegal migration. The prosperous West is under 
siege, this popular refrain tells us; the hordes are ascending.’42 This overlap is evident for 
instance in the provisions of the United Kingdom’s Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008. Essentially a key criminal justice legislation; with copious provisions on youth 
rehabilitation orders, sentencing, criminal appeals, pornography and sexual offences and so 
on, it also creates a ‘special immigration status’ for terror convicts.43 The security dimension 
to the migration conundrum is not of further interest here, but it is appropriate to note that it 
is a dimension that resonates strongly in the policy and politics of migration-prone countries 
in recent times.  
The much amended Immigration Act 1971 (and the Immigration Rules- ‘the Rules’- made 
under it) remains ‘the cornerstone of UK immigration law.’44 In broad terms, the United 
Kingdom sets family reunion, economic and humanitarian grounds as migration routes. 
However, it is an aspect of the economic route which is of interest here. The economic route 
is generally divided into skilled migrants (workers) and commercial categories. It is the 
commercial migration laws and policies, specifically the aspects that deal with encouraging 
or attracting foreign entrepreneurs and investors that are relevant here.
45
   
The United Kingdom now shares with Australia and Canada a Points Based System (PBS) for 
migration with significant similarities and emphases on economic migration. Each of them 
has at some point in time within the past two decades, integrated commercial immigration 
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into their migration system under the rubric of economic migration.
46
 The admission criteria 
for this category of migrants are based on the level of investment they are capable and willing 
to commit to their destination countries.
47
 More applicable to this discussion is the special 
consideration that is given to entrepreneurs or investors or investors.
48
 Each of the three 
countries have fast track settlement and citizenship as reward for bringing in foreign capital 
into (any of) them.
49
 
In the United Kingdom, the policy is well captured in recent changes announced to the Points 
Based System by the Home Office regarding entrepreneurs and investors, part of which is 
worth quoting here  
Investors told us that what they value most is the ability to achieve settlement more 
quickly in the UK…Those investing £10m or more may apply for settlement after 2 
years, and those investing £5m or more may apply after 3 years…an entrepreneur may 
apply for settlement after 3 years, instead of after 5, where he has created 10 
sustainable jobs or generated £5m turnover over the 3 year period.
50
 
 
This migration policy thrust reflects directly in the determination of migration applications; 
migration case-work. In migration case-work, there are typically three independent (though 
not necessarily mutually exclusive) factors considered in the determination of migration 
applications in the OECD countries in focus. The applicable factor (s) depends on the 
circumstances of the applicant or the nature of the application. Two of these factors, ‘family 
reunion’ and ‘humanitarian assistance’ appear to have been incorporated into migration case-
work in fulfilment of regional and international law obligations. International human rights 
law (even if in less than a satisfactory manner in the view of some) mediates state sovereignty 
in the realm of migration. This is the case as the very status of refugees and asylum seekers 
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are essentially creations of international law for instance.
51
 For instance, the continued (even 
if in some cases, reluctant) incorporation of both values into various UK migration 
legislation, ministerial statements,
52
 policy guidance documents and the case law, as matters 
of regional or  international (and more recently, national) human rights
53
 and, or, international 
humanitarian law obligations
54
  demonstrate this fact. 
However, it is the much less scrutinised third possible consideration; ‘economic value’ that is 
of interest in this discussion. State economic cooperation is a feature of the international 
economic system, at least from the perspective of the longstanding traditions (and practice) of 
international trade.
55
 Migrants who follow this ‘economic value’ for entry into the UK fall 
into the category of what for the purposes of this discussion, will called ‘commercial 
migrants’ governed by commercial immigration law.56  
It is interesting to note that this preferential treatment of the category referred to by 
government as ‘high value’ migrants’57 constitutes an integral part of its policy commitment 
to ‘reducing net migration in the UK to the tens of thousands.’58 This preference for 
economic benefit through migration accords with the context of neo-liberal capitalism 
dominant in these countries. These commercial migration programmes designed as one 
commentator put it, to seek out the neo-liberal homo economicus
59
 are not intrinsically 
objectionable. They have even been adopted by at least 29 countries all over the world.
60
 
However, the devil is in the detail. It is the potential for complicity in corruption and 
underdevelopment in the global south which such laws and policies may mask that is the 
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source of concern as will be made clear presently. The concern is that such migration laws 
and policies promote corruption and at least indirectly, produce mass suffering elsewhere. 
  
The critical question is who are the potential investors from the global south envisaged by 
these laws and policies? It is tall order to expect they will only be drawn from the numbers of 
ordinary, honest, hardworking, individuals who have, through their industry made good for 
themselves and acquired assets which, even by OECD standards, amount to a handsome 
fortune which they would be interested in investing in a developed country like the United 
Kingdom. What with the high cost of inputs, labour and tax regimes which have driven 
British (and other OECD member countries) citizens’ owned industries (and in some cases, 
services) British and other to relocate to the global south? Recall also that majority of the 
‘world’s poor’ who live on less than a dollar or two daily are from the global south countries. 
It is logical and plausible to assume that at least some of the prospective entrepreneurs and 
investors capable and willing to invest in the country on the quid pro quo of expedited 
settlement or citizenship are more likely to be PEPs who have acquired illicit wealth through 
political corruption and require an avenue to legitimise them. As stated earlier, many PEPs 
from the global south, even without the prospect of OECD member countries’ residency or 
citizenship have already found secure havens in the OECD countries for looted funds meant 
for development in their respective home countries. Therefore, the offer of residency or 
citizenship is in effect an icing on the cake; a welcome ‘edge over the competition’ for their 
loot and a route to legitimisation of the same.  
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing reality, the relevant migration laws and policies of the United 
Kingdom are remarkably silent on scrutiny of the source of funds of the prospective 
entrepreneurs and investors. The Rules stipulate the requirements to be met for the grant of 
entry clearance, continued stay and settlement in the UK by these two categories of 
commercial migrants but does not refer to scrutiny of the source of funds of the applicant.
61
 It 
is relevant to note in this regard, that the Rules contain omnibus grounds for refusal of any 
category of application.
62
 However, these provisions referred to in the law and policy 
guidance as ‘General Grounds for Refusal’ and ‘General Reasons for Refusing’ (the 
grounds), do not make any reference to tainted funds, corruption or even terrorism, as one of 
a number of grounds for refusal of entry, continued leave to remain or settlement in the 
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United Kingdom. This is despite the fact that the criminal record of the applicant is one of the 
grounds for refusal.
 63
 Going by the policy guidance document, this latter provision 
contemplates fraud relating to the application for a visa, leave to remain (in the UK) or 
settlement as applicable and previous (or current) conviction history.
64
 
 
Arguably, there is a further ground which, may be invoked to scrutinise the integrity (or 
otherwise) of funds of prospective foreign entrepreneur and investors. Paragraph 321 (iii) 
provides for situations where ‘exclusion would be conducive to the public good.’ 
Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that exclusion from or refusal of either type of visa 
or leave to remain based on it, is within the contemplation of Parliament or policy thrust of 
the Home Office as currently constituted. Rather, it appears that exclusion for not conducing 
to ‘the public good’ is driven (essentially) by (national) security and public safety concerns. 
The policy guidance document elucidates that the exclusion provisions operate where there is 
reason to believe it is not in the public good to admit or allow a person to remain in the UK  
‘because of their character, conduct or associations.’65 This may be because of their 
membership of a proscribed group, being suspected or war crimes or even where their 
presence may lead to the commission of an infringement of UK law or breach of public peace 
among others.
66
  
 
In consequence, there are no provisions to scrutinise the integrity of the funds of prospective 
entrepreneurs or investors in the relevant legislation or copious policy guidance documents 
on this category of migrants in general.
 67
 Not surprisingly, there are also no specific 
provisions that demonstrate concern for, or awareness of the circumstance of corrupt PEPs 
who are well- positioned to take advantage of these migration schemes for money laundering. 
Hence, there is a real danger that the source of such wealth may be highly tainted. In light of 
this, there ought to be checks to forestall the introduction of corruptly sourced funds from 
being laundered through such otherwise ‘neutral’ laws and policies. The imperative of this is 
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underscored by the reality that the financial institutions of OECD countries, as variously 
illustrated above, are  advantaged in their access not only to lawful, but also, illicit funds in 
the global financial system.
68
  
 
Here it is pertinent to briefly mention the operations of two important two global financial 
sector-centred groupings; the Wolfsberg Group and the Egmont Group.
 69
 The main aim of 
the Wolfsberg Group which comprises eleven leading (global) banks
70
 is to develop standards 
for the financial services industry generally, and more relevant to this discourse, Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) and Counter Terrorist Finance (CTF) policies. The group was since 
formulated and published a number of ‘statements,’ ‘principles’ and ‘papers’ to guide 
legislators and regulators on appropriate standards for the conduct of financial services in 
pursuit of its objectives.
71
 A principal document it developed is the Wolsfberg Anti-Money 
Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking issued in November 2002.
72
 Of particular 
relevance here also is the Wolfsberg Group ‘Statement against Corruption’ made in 2007 in 
which the group expressed support for international efforts to combat corruption generally. 
This has recently been supplanted by the Wolfsberg Anti-Corruption Guidance issued in 
August 2011.
73
  
 
The Egmont Group is made of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) from different parts of the 
world. This group is similarly committed to combating money laundering and financing of 
terrorism by improving and supporting the capacity of FIUs in the discharge of their 
functions. Its goals are advanced through the expansion and systematisation of financial 
intelligence information exchange, personnel training and better communications among 
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FIUs.
74
 However, despite the operation of these two groups; private sector and governmental 
sector-led initiatives respectively, it is a notorious fact
75
 that PEPs still penetrate the financial 
system of the OECD countries with disturbing impunity. 
 
In contrast to the lax regime regarding the source of funds for investment in the United 
Kingdom, it, at least, in the last decade, developed a more articulated regime to counter 
terrorism funding which, as mentioned earlier, along with money laundering, also constitutes 
a major source of international financial concern. As a result of this regime, Charities for 
instance have been obliged-through a rash of legislation- to comply with an array of measures 
designed to prevent the funding of terrorist activities.
76
 The latest and perhaps, most 
comprehensive, targeted legislation on terrorism-funding is the Terrorist Asset-Freezing e.t.c. 
Act 2010 (the Act).
77
 The basis of the designation is essentially reasonable believe that such 
person is or has been involved in terrorist activity, or is under the direct or indirect control of 
a person so involved and HM Treasury considers it is necessary for purposes connected with 
protecting members of the public from terrorism that financial restrictions should be applied 
in relation to the person.
 78
   
 
The Act confers powers on Her Majesty’s Treasury to designate a person (natural or legal) as 
being believed or suspected of involvement in terrorism. On such designation, HM Treasury 
has the power to impose financial restrictions on such persons. It has the power to freeze 
funds and economic resources of designated persons. It further has the power to restrict 
making available funds, financial services and economic resources to, or for the benefit of 
such persons. In light of this attention to the second arm of what is easily the more 
complicated aspect of financial intelligence,
79
 current gaps with regard to oversight of the 
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source of funds for high value migrant prospects is arguably not so much of a faux pas but a 
convenient remiss. 
 
Given the global and cross-border link between money laundering and corruption,
80
 it is 
crucial that OECD countries make conscious efforts to block rather than facilitate the 
opportunities for laundering illicit gains from corruption by PEPs. Otherwise, they ought to 
be deemed liable for promoting poverty and underdevelopment of the global south and the 
recurring cycles of violence in that part of the world. The current laws and policies of the 
United Kingdom under consideration here with regard to entrepreneurs and investors, in as 
much as they do not demonstrate an awareness of the prospect of facilitating the transfer and 
legitimation of illicit funds by PEPs from the global south represents the manner in which 
law, as a mode of social ordering, facilitates and promotes irresponsibility as argued by Scott 
Veitch.
81
 
 
IV. MAKING THE CONNECTIONS – POTENTIAL COMPLICITY IN 
CORRUPTION, POVERTY, CONFLICT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
The United Kingdom is a notable member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. The principal concern of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, as the name suggests, is cooperation- essentially European - for economic 
development. While it was established by 18 European member countries (but also including 
in that number, the United States), it professes a mission of dedication to ‘global 
development.’ Not surprisingly, membership of the OECD which currently stands at 34 now 
includes not only the most economically advanced countries, but the ‘emerging countries’ of 
Mexico, Chile and Turkey. The OECD also works ‘closely with emerging giants like China, 
India and Brazil’ as well as ‘developing economies in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean.’82 Given this background, it is logical to posit that the OECD will be concerned 
about and strongly involved with development efforts in the ‘global south’ since its mission is 
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‘to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world.’83   
The scourge corruption poses to effective governance has become a source of major concern 
in the international system. The concern has been reflected in the enactment of not just 
national legislation but also, many international instruments directed principally at checking 
corruption.
84
 Two notable such instruments are the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Bribery Convention) 
and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).
85
 The reason for concern 
for political corruption within the international system is the debilitating effect it has on state 
governance.
86
 Analysts have noted that ‘political corruption undermines political and 
economic development in many countries.’87 PEPs, as stated above, are key players in 
political corruption. The argument here is that corrupt PEPs form an important category of 
potential entrepreneurs and investors targeted by the high value migrants’ programme. The 
existing blind-spot of the financial regulatory regime on the source of investors fund can be 
construed even from a sympathetic perspective, as condoning corruption for economic profit.  
There is recognition that an important linkage exists between corruption and 
underdevelopment. The World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
as well as the United Nations’ Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) all agree that corruption 
is the single greatest obstacle to global economic and social development.
88
 Development 
efforts in the global south naturally suffer more from the problem of corruption than any 
other part of the world. A recent stakeholders forum hosted in Morocco observed that the 
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high levels of corruption in the Arab region form an important part of the recent and on-going 
upheaval in that part of the world.
89
 
As UNODC explains, corruption undermines democracy and the rule of law and 
delegitimizes the authority of the state which is then no longer viewed as a representative but 
an enemy.
90
 Citizens are more prone to ‘reclaim’ their right to use force91 in such 
circumstances of fractured state legitimacy. Not only does corruption severely compromise 
the ability of the state to promote development, but it also makes the break out of civic 
violence, and even civil war, a real possibility as has been witnessed in many parts of 
Africa.
92
 Violent conflict can in turn accentuate the level of poverty leading to ‘no-exit cycles 
of conflict,’ with serious negative implications for effective governance and development.93 
The goal of achieving a more peaceful world requires focus on reducing poverty.
94
 This is 
because among others, the incidence of violent conflict typically diverts resources required 
for socio-economic development and provision of infrastructure and social-services to 
armament. It also leads to loss of lives and destruction of property.
95
 
Peace and conflict scholars have similarly pointed out that political corruption is a key trigger 
of conflict. Reviewing the incidence of corruption in Africa and its impact, Monty Marshall 
and Ted Gurr have expressed the view that ‘grand corruption’ is ‘perhaps, the greatest threat 
to security and development in Africa.’96 UNODC has observed in this regard that many of 
the countries perceived to be highly corrupt are either in conflict or recently emerged from 
it.
97
 These sorts of findings roundly implicate some PEPs in countries of the global south. In 
light of this reality, inaction or negligence in policies like the high value migrant programme 
which has the potential to facilitate laundering of proceeds of corruption from global south by 
PEPs raises the spectre of complicity. 
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The United Kingdom, as well as various OECD governments license and regulate the 
activities of their respective  financial institutions and are expected to ensure their compliance 
with the respective countries’ regional and international commitments on controlling 
corruption, financial crimes and money-laundering. However, the  recent failure and near-
collapse of the financial sector right under the noses of these same governments to the direct 
detriment of their economies suggests that even in cases where their national interests are 
apparently imperilled,  the respective governments are either weak or negligent in their 
regulation of the financial sector. Inherent in this argument is a general failure of action. In 
light of this, an alternative, perhaps less morally inculpating (even sympathetic) way to view 
the situation is to argue that the failure of action is not so much one of moral complicity, but 
rather, one of negligent regulation. On this view, the burden of state complicity in harm as 
contemplated by Veitch could be mitigated somewhat when considered from the perspective 
of tortious liability of public authorities and the limitations that have been be set up to limit it 
for instance.
98
   
A return to the analogy of torts law, specifically in the area of intentional tort, provides the 
basis for the second argument. This is an agency argument. As stated above, the three stages 
of money-laundering are placement, layering and integration.  While each of these stages are 
passively condoned on the facts by OECD countries with regard to transfer of illicit funds 
derived from corruption, it is argued that migration policies like the high value migrant 
programme constitute a higher level of complicity in corruption in the global south since they 
potentially facilitate legitimation through integration of illicit funds from corrupt PEPs. This 
is because the other two stages are arguably largely within the direct control of private 
players whose activities the (OECD) state is meant to regulate in the first place.    
It is important to note here that the migration laws and policies of the United Kingdom have 
become more stringent against even skilled migrant workers while simultaneously reaching 
out to the more privileged nationals of the global south. Accordingly, aspects of its skilled 
workers route have been ‘refocused.’ 99 Existing workers schemes have either been restricted 
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or scrapped altogether and supplemented with an ‘Exceptional Talent’100 scheme. This seeks 
to attract those who are ‘internationally recognised as world leaders in their field’ and also 
‘migrants who show exceptional promise and who are likely to become internationally 
recognised world leaders in their field.’ 101 The United Kingdom’s current approach forms 
part of a larger north-south migration policy contradiction. On the one hand, this approach 
promotes, even ‘impose,’ the mobility of capital around the world. 102 On the other hand, it 
discourages and sometimes outlaws labour mobility ‘across international borders’. 103   
This approach is to be criticised two reasons. First is the obvious the impact of the brain-drain 
and fiscal implications for development of the global south. Second and more objectionable 
still, is the risk that a minority with access to public funds and patronages constitute a good 
number of potential candidates that will seek to take up the opportunities offered by the 
preferential migration opportunities in question. The lack of regulation on the source of funds 
of high value migrants creates a risk that this is a route into the west which may promote 
corruption. These realities inform the contention that the United Kingdom (and other OECD 
countries like Australia and Canada) should distance itself from policies that hold the 
potential to further exacerbate corruption in the developing countries of the global south.
104
  
CONCLUSION – MERGING RHETORIC WITH PROACTIVE LAW AND POLICY 
There is a need for more empirical research into the ‘High Value’ migrant process to assess 
the origins of the investments of such migrants. Ronaldo Munck has rightly observed that 
whereas migration is a global issue, studies of the phenomenon has proceeded largely from a 
‘decontextualised’ paradigm in which the political economy responsible for ‘migratory flows’ 
is neither studied nor understood.
105
 The article is hopefully a little contribution to correcting 
some of the obvious imbalance. Through a critique of the ‘High Value’ migrant category 
policy of the UK (as a mirror of similar migration schemes in some OECD countries), the 
position advanced in the foregoing discuss is the need to take cognisance of the impact of 
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such ‘neutral’ policies and their implication for peace and development in the global south. 
This is important, no matter how marginal such impact may be. Incidentally, the impact of 
grand corruption for the global south and the north is not one that can be dismissed as of little 
consequence from the perspective of law, development and sustainable peace, regionally or 
internationally. Globalisation, with its intricacies has ensured that, or so one would like to 
think. 
At first blush, there is a paradox in suggesting a change of the current migration regime in the 
United Kingdom specifically and some other OECD countries in general. Protagonists of 
such policies contend that the current regime best serves the socio-economic interests of the 
countries considered here in particular and other immigrant-prone countries in general. This 
is especially so in the current experience of economic recession with a focus on how to 
stimulate economic recovery and promote economic growth. However, without conceding 
that on a short-term view, this may be in the interest of those countries, it has been argued 
that aspects of the current migration regime are corruption-friendly.  
There is ample evidence that financial institutions in the OECD countries are the major 
destination and beneficiaries of illicit funds from political corruption in the global south. Any 
law and, or, policy which even remotely advances that purpose stand only to be condemned 
by all well-meaning people everywhere in light of the analysis of its impact on the global 
south in particular and global economic and social development in general. 
The professed goal of the OECD is to work along with its members and other countries all 
over the world ‘to build a stronger, cleaner, fairer world’ economy.106 The thrust of the 
discussion above is that this declared goal is long on words and short in real commitment set 
against the current migration laws and policies of three of the leading member states 
considered here. That has to change not only to fulfil legitimate expectations within the 
context of international relations, but also for domestic socio-economic interests of the 
OECD countries.  
The rhetoric of international commitment to global anti-corruption is one of the strongest in 
the international system in recent times. The OECD countries lead the campaign not only 
through the instrumentality of the OECD, but other fora like the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) especially the Breton Woods institutions. As a result, anti-corruption 
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initiatives have for some time received serious attention from, and integrated into the 
operations of the World Bank especially. Such initiatives are welcome but it has so far been 
argued that there is a considerable deficit in the prosecution of that commitment. Indeed, that 
deficit amounts to a direct complicity in corruption and all of its attendant consequences 
including debilitating poverty and violence in the same countries which the commitments are 
directed.  
There is an important case to be made for merging the rhetoric of the anti-corruption stance 
of the OECD member countries as reflected in many OECD statements and encapsulated in 
the Bribery corruption with ‘positive’ law and policies to check corruption. The advantages 
for all stakeholders are obvious; less corruption, more real investment in the global south and 
less economic migration, cost-efficiency in the long run, less socio-political tension in 
immigrant destinations, more peace and stability and economic development in migrant-
source countries. 
There is a better empirically supported and morally viable argument to be made for the view 
that from a robust and long-term perspective, aspects of the current migration laws and 
policies of the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia discussed above, have significant 
implications for not only the global south, but for the OECD countries too. This derives from 
the experience of corruption in those countries. It has become evident that corruption has 
attendant widespread negative and destabilising consequences for peace and socio economic 
development. It has led to state-regression, underdevelopment, poverty, spirals of violence, 
low-level internal conflict, national and even regional civil-war in poor and developing 
countries. The migration and asylum demands commonly generated by various combinations 
of these and related conditions in various countries of the global south suggest the need for an 
urgent rethink of laws and policies that promote their occurrence. A failure to reform the 
current migration regime in the direction of shutting the door against, rather than being at the 
least, potentially complicit in corruption by PEPs will return to haunt any country that has 
promoted it, even if only indirectly, sooner rather than later.   
 
 
